



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Die Deutsch Philosophie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen,
 RAYMUND SCHMIDT, editor. Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 1921. Vol-
 umes 1 and 2, Pp. 228; 203.

Conceive of a history of European philosophy in which each of the authors had presented his own views in final and well considered form. It would be a fascinating book to read. Less enviable, perhaps, would be the task of the editor. If he had a conscientious desire to make his volume uniform in any sense, he might find difficulty. Not only would there be a tendency on the part of his contributors to expatiate unduly, but a sort of waywardness might be expected. One would not be surprised to find Plato setting down his thought in a myth. Augustine might wish to publish an exhortation and Thomas a Kempis a pious prayer. I am inclined to think there would be slighter difficulty with the German contributors; for after all, to be a philosopher in Germany is to have a profession and to recognize professional rules and etiquette.

So we might expect to find in this history of contemporary German philosophy, to which each of the writers has contributed his own statement of his views and of their psychogenesis, a certain "cut and driedness." Such an expectation is, however, by no means justified by the contents of the volume. There is, to be sure, a noticeable dominance of the idol of the system over certain of the contributors. One "decided to become a philosopher." Another, when he was called to an academic position, discovered that he was supposed by the traditions of the post to lecture on certain subjects and forthwith began to do so. And frequently one is aware that the progress of a man's thought is too greatly determined by a sense of obligation to fill the picture previously outlined, or to expand his theories so as to cover every portion of the philosophic field.

It is altogether probable that these faults, if faults they be, are due to the fact that the representatives of philosophy whose views are here given are principally in the university world and of the philosophical department. One is glad to note that the editor, Dr. Raymund Schmidt, promises that future volumes will also contain a presentation of authors whose contributions lie in the field of the philosophy of law, of education and other departments. Yet even in this present group there are men who have done important work outside the strict limits of their departmental duties.

Moreover, one is struck by the free and courageous criticism which a man of the stamp of Karl Joël directs at the traditions of university teaching, when he designates lectures as "the passive subjection of a crowd of students to a specialized mass of material which they do not digest." The editor is justified in his promise that

the collection will consist of striking contrasts. The men whose contributions constitute the first volume are Paul Barth, Erich Becher, Hans Driesch, Karl Joël, A. Meinong, Paul Natorp, Johannes Rehmke and Johannes Volkelt; those appearing in the second being Erich Adickes, Clemens Baeumker, Jonas Cohn, Hans Cornelius, Karl Groos, Alois Höfler, Ernst Troeltsch, and Hans Vaihinger. There is no need to make invidious comparisons; they are a distinguished group. The absence of such names as Rudolph Eucken, Aloys Riehl, and Ernst Mach may cause surprise, particularly since no reason is given for their omission.

In so far as any general trend is noticeable throughout the work, I think it would be fair to interpret it as a return to the older tradition of German idealism. Fortunately, there can be no suspicion that this is due to the editor's selection, for Dr. Schmidt has indeed adhered scrupulously to his above-mentioned intention of making the collection a genuine symposium. If I am justified in claiming to discover the renaissance of idealism, it is surely advisable to spell it with a small "i." Yet the emphasis is unmistakable, and is manifest in the motive which, for instance, has led Vaihinger, and his collaborators, Groos and Cornelius, to reinterpret the *Philosophie des als Ob* as a positivistic idealism in which the *Als-Ob* world becomes the world of values more especially of a religious order. This interest, so clearly reminiscent of ante-Hegelian thought, seems to account in large part for the admirably modest recognition of the essentially personal aspects of problems of evaluation. Undoubtedly it also accounts for the importance given to the biographic and psychogenetic conception of philosophy, as voiced by Fichte: *Was für eine Philosophie man wähle, hängt davon ab, was für ein Mensch man sei*. It is significant that this sentence is quoted several times in these volumes.

That each of the contributors is aware of a certain embarrassment in speaking of himself is evident. "*De nobis ipsis silemus*," Paul Natorp begins—and others echo the sentiment. They are over-anxious, in numerous instances, to avoid self-advertisement. "Americanism" (*sic*), is discounted. The writers recognize that they can not hope properly to estimate their own contributions to philosophic literature. Meinong, whose contribution is unfortunately a final summary of his views, writes thus of the difficulty of the undertaking—"When one's work is drawing to an end, the question may naturally confront one as to what one has accomplished in this brief day of life. But if he as genuinely desires to answer the question, the feeling will arise that he can only conscientiously give account of that which he has sought to do, not of that which he has achieved."

Each article is preceded by a photograph of the author, excellent in craftsmanship and in several instances striking portraits. The book is attractively made, though the economy of cloth is evident. One wonders who in Germany can afford to pay sixty marks for a volume, though at the present rate of exchange, it is considerably less expensive than a similar book would be in this country.

JAMES GUTMANN.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. Sept.-Oct., 1921. *De quelques espèces d'égalités et de quelques-uns de leurs avantages ou inconvénients* (pp. 146-172): ADRIEN NAVILLE.—A duality of conceptions of equality must be distinguished: equality of contribution in exchange, and equality of individual returns. Equality is always a psychical fact, and sociologically and morally it is not the case that where there is equality of contribution in exchange there is, or can be, equality of return. Justice is equality; but there are many varieties of equality, and these are not always reconcilable. *La perception de la synthèse psychique* (Suite: pp. 173-191): F. PAULHAN.—We "encounter everywhere in conscious life the perception of synthesis. It constitutes the essential element in the control of the mind and in the control of its elements. . . . The perception of a harmony . . . or a discordance is continually in us, and this is the knowledge . . . and appreciation by the mind and its elements of these elements themselves and the elements of these elements." *Eléments objectifs du monde matériel* (Suite: pp. 192-232): P. DUPONT.—The point of departure for science after stripping away every human element consists of relations of difference, similarity and dissimilarity, and the like. The intellectual character of these relations is no ground for denying objectivity. No photograph of the objective of science can be given, and if it be called just *X*, it can be shown that this *X* "is a collection of a multitude of *x*'s discriminable by us," and the relations between them can be firmly established. The objective of science can not then be equated with nothingness. *La notion des centres coordinateurs cérébraux et le mécanisme du langage* (suite: pp. 233-280): H. PIÉRON.—"The progress of our localizations is incontestable; from the moment that we no longer seek to localize the entities, imaginary faculties, and judgments of value . . . and all the *idola* of traditional psychology and expect to find . . . only the histo-morphological correspondents of psycho-physiological processes